Icarncd and alcilful clergy. Fourier propounded his "phalansteries", and dreamcd dreams of au harmonious society wherein Organisation slioulcl heget a happiness perfect and complete. Then came Comte dcnouncing all thcse endeavours äs vitiated by the fact that an all-convincing social science-a science of practical politicshad not first been formulated. It was on the heights of such positive social science Comte hoped to gain a view-point which should embrace not only the good in the eighteenth Century philosophy, äs handed on by Condorcet, but also wha'tever of truth inight reside in it after the damaging assaults of De Maistre on its negative character. Comte thus became the completer of Descartes, who had done so much to foster the positive spirit. A reform in philosophic method was the fundamental notion of Positivism. It was precisely Comte who first understood the scientific issues and realised the changed conditions of philosophy. He saw that philosophy may no more seclude herseif in abstract thought, and construct theories to which facts must bend.. Comte, realising the proud security whence the positive sciences now scrutinize the results of speculative philosophy, makes the creation of a positive social science constitute the fundamental unity of the whole philosophical System. The conception of a social evolution-of humanity äs a developing organism-is set forth by Comte in the "Positive Politics 59 , but had already been dimiy apprehended by Condorcet. The historic evolution set forth by Comte is in rnarked contrast to HegelX since it is external-an exterior procession in fact-in place of the Hegelian development of spirit from within. positive theöry of knowledge could not, in his vievv, be separated from this new science of his, with its not very pleasing name of Sociology.
To every branch of knowledge he would apply one and the same method. And the method is no sooner found than the philosophy is formed. Now, it is obvious that, in treating the transcendental äs inaccessible to the intellect, Comte made his System defective and incomplete. He saw but one side of the shield, äs Spencer lias seen the other. And it is a logical weakness to treat humanity äs an organism without extending the organic : idea to the medium and conditions under which the social life of humanitî s developed. Man or mind individual Comte would construe through humanity, rather than huinanity through individual mindi, The individual is for him only an "abstraction", and exists only through universal humanity. Humanity is for him supreme moral end, but he certainly unfolded no proper and universally related moral System. Whatever difficulties may attend the pursuit ,of an absolute philosophy, these we certainly prefer to a System which, like that of Comte, deceives itself äs to what is divine, disbelieves the relatedness of the universe that Stands over against man, and destroys its unity by treating the part äs the whole. Even precursors of the positive philosophy, like Descartes and Bacon, were not able to resist the craving for an "absolute 3 ' knowledge. Among those he most deeply influenced were Littre and Hippolyte Taine. Vain and preposterous äs have been the attempts to take Comte's System in lieu of the great philosophies of the absolute, these attempts derogate not frorn the highly meritorious Services Comte rendered. These are evidenced by the fact that over the broad realrns of philosophical, historical, and scientific research, the spirit of bis doctrine may everywhere be found today äs a deep, pervasive iufluence. For DO one in the Century, perhaps, may be so truly claimed the merit of having propounded a new System äs for Comte.
In the latter half of the nineteenth Century, philosophy in France presents a soinewhat striking contrast to what we see in the first half of the Century. This is in respect of the fact that it presents no school so dominating and centralising in influence äs Eclecticism was about the year 1830. Now the influence of Kant is feit, and now that of Leibniz ancl Schelling. At other times evolutionary tendencies are manifest, due to the theories of Lamarck and Spencer, while at yet other points of time Comtean influences come into view. To this we shall return later.
It was äs succeeding the destructive and passionate criticism of the eighteenth Century that Maine de Biran became one of the founders of Spiritualism in France. Theirs was a spiritualism becoming enough, no doubt, but lacking in the ferment of life.
In iho hands of Biran and Royer-Collard it soon became an offic&l spiritualism. Haine de Biran did not profess to find tlie absolute. He kept sure foothold on experience. He distrusted the idea of substance, which, in the philosophy of Descartes, had tended towards pantheism. He made for himself, in the end, a kind of via niedia between Stoicism and Christianity. The former he supposed to make too much of man's will, and the latter too little.
Maine de Biran was föllowed by his devoted disciple Cousin, famed for his wide Eclecticism. Other founders of spiritualism were such disciples of Cousin äs Jouffroy, Saisset, Vacherot, Janet, Garnier, Ravaisson, Jules Simon, Damiron, Franck, and brilliant essayists like Caro and Bersot. Cousin's method is eclectic, but spiritualism is the soul of his System. His morality is exactly that of spiritualism, mediate and traditional. His Eclecticism was clearly not that of piecing together paus of other Systems; that is just what it was not. It professed to base itself on observation and induction, to arrive at unity . "solely by the aid of the experimental method". Of course, this method. in resting on observation that is complete, will include the truth in other and less complete Systems; therefore does Cousin. choose to call his method eclectic. So his Eclecticism has to do with the teachings of historical philosophy, äs well äs with the facts of consciousness. And, äs matter of fact, he soon brought into his brilliant teachings -for he was the most influential French philosopher of the Century-elements that stood in irreconciläble contradiction to each other. The truth is, he was unable to abide faithful to his own method, and^ to carry analysis to its furthest possibilities.
Eclectic spiritualism waned after Cousin. Even Jouffroy, with soul athirst for certitude, did not find in the teachings of his master perfect satisfaction. Jouffroy made man the centre of his philosophical studies, and made will central in man. Man is a free force; to him there is an order universal and impersonal in God; all morality for him consists in respect for this universal order. The psychology of Cousin and Jouffroy, based on observation" by means of consciousness and reflection, was used in support of a spiritualistic metaphysic.
Vacherot sät loosely to Eclecticism, and was not afraid to deal with tlie metaphysical problems in the attempt to found a new spiritnalistic. school. The idea of perfection, the conception of the infinite, the notion of the ideal, were all handled by Vacherot, who held perfection to be incompatible with real existence. Vacherot had a spiritualistic bent, and, after Cousin, tended to give an ontological turn to psychology. It has been, for him, rather unsympathetically put that "the idea of perfection is God, but that perfection has no existence". Caro has dealt with Vacherot's positions in severely critical fashion, leaving him only a shadowy deity-a figment of the Imagination. The infinite is, with Vacherot, simply the all-the all or nothing. The deity of Vacherot's idealism is, when developed, merely an ideal one: he cleaves to the notion of a perfect deity who does not really exist, for a true God cannot, witb him, be living and real! Caro contends, on the other hand, that a God who does not exist is no God at all. As against Vacherot's contention that he yet guards the objective reality of deity äs perfectly independent of the mind, Caro retorts that Vacherofs God-äs the Supreine Ideal-is a purely abstract and subjective conception, the mere product of human reason, the pure and simple result of our own intellectual operations.
Saisset has rendered manifest how the personality of God is maintained by pantheism always and only at the expense of personality in man.
Paul Janet has been a steadfast supporter of Eclecticisin, and has laid down a morality which is a Variation on the inotives of Kantian duty, coupled with a doctrine of final causes.
Damiron, äs a moralist of the school of Cousin, rejected a priori every System that did not comport with faith in the beautiful, in God, and in the future life.
From various sides we see metaphysical speculation gradually asserting itself in the latter half of the Century against both Eclectic and Positivist tendencies. Ravaisson sought to establish au aesthetic morality, bascd on the identity of thc good with the beautiful.
Inftuonced by Aristotle, Leibnix and Schelling, he shcwed philosoplücal leanings to a metaphysical knowledge in \vhich real being, or the absolute, is disclosed by an Intuition of the rcason. By such disclosure reason becomes linked to the absolute äs true principle of all existence, beauty, and knowledge.
Again, Secretan took up for the main principle of his philosophy the idea of God's absolute liberty, and founded thereupon an argument for liberty in man. The problems of evil and of divine personality did not escape him. But his pleadings for liberty constituted his deepest influence on French philosophic thought Under Kantian Inspiration, teachings like those of Lachelier and Boutroux have displayed idealistic tendencies. Boutroux has set forth the philosophy of contingency with great power, and made his influence feit beyond the bounds of France. This is a form of philosophic conception with which the twentieth Century wili have to reckon. Boutroux takes cognisance of the postulates and results of the positive sciences, and seeks to do füll justice to reality. Renouvicr is at once idealist and phenomenalist, and has proved an able philosopher. Renouvier has stood out äs severe critic of eclectic spiritualism. He blames its method-or rather its lack of method-even more than its conclusions. Renouvier postulates a beginning for the world, holds the ascending series or infinite regress of causes to have had a first term, takes liberty and contingency to pertain to the world of phenomena, and thinks man's liberty and personality capable of being critically established. For Renouvier is nothing if not critical. His System he calls "Criticisme". It leans at points to Leibnizianisrn. His stand for individual freedom is a bold one. Pantheism and fatalism he would avoid by a rigid exclusion of the idea of substance. Conscience is for him the revelation of the absolute, and the main stress of his ethical teaching lies on duty. This form of Neo-Kantism has exerced great influence for good on French philosophic thought, under Renouvier, Brochard, Pillon, and Dauriäc. As a Criticisme' 3 , it may be allowed to have made, in certain critical aspects, an advance (äs idealistic phenomenalism) on the older metaphysics. Fouillee has propounded a System of philosophy vvhich h äs the great merit of being broad, comprehensive, and consistent Its dominating idea is that of the idees-forces. In his view, an idea is not a mere reproduction or representation in the mind of some object outside itself, but is at the same time a force working for its own realisation. In this way ideas are real factors in our mental evolution, for they condition actual changes wrought within us. Not only so, but they have consequential effects on the world without us, äs we give them outlet in our outward actions. The bold and «triking conception of Fouillee is that the idea is a form of volition äs well äs of thought: it is, on his precise shewing, no longer a form, but an act, conscious of its own direction, quality, and intensity. We see what an important law is thus suggested by his idees-forces, though, of course, it remains to be seen whether it will prove an adequate foundation for the vast superstructure he has sought to rear thereupon. It is on this basis Fouillee tries to rear a monism of idees-forces that shall overpass any propounded by idealism or materalism. For critical skill, constructive power, modernness of spirit, and metaphysical acumen, the philosophical work of Fouillee deserves great praise, whatever may by its final appraisement. He has shewn a most worthy conception of philosophy äs the study of "reality itself both äs fact and consciousness" -reality "not immobile and äs if crystallised in the past", but "in the process of becoming" and determining "the future a . Fouillee and Renouvier have done more than any other thinkers, in the latter half of the nineteenth Century, for philosophy in France, Fouillee by his idea-forces opposing merely mechanical views of the universe, and Renouvier opposing the unintelligible äs being, in fact, the self-contradictory, Fouillee rejects the philosophy of contingency, which Renouvier accepte, Dauriac also has ably defended contingency against Fouillee's attacks. Hardly behind Fouillee and Renouvier has been Caro, in respect of his brilliant exposition and defence 6f spiritualistic philosophy. The highest problems of thought he coufronted and treatecl with a rare power of philosophical polemic. Caro is a striking and boautiful philosophic personality, maintaining hie positions with Singular skill, lucidity, and grace. These positions ränge thoinsolvos round such subjects äs God, the soul, the future lifc, and duty. The God for whom,' äs a spirituälistic philosopher, he contends, must be a God living, intelligent, and loving. Only such a God carries for hiin real perfection-the •perfection of thought and love. Reason is able to conceive such a deity, he holds, and the religious conscience can : approve Hirn, not blind Necessity. ' Guyau took for his main idea that of life-life äs a principle of natural power, expansion, and fruitfulness. He strove to shew how, in tliis way, the individual and the social points .of view might be reconciled. Guyau possessed great depth of feeling and cliarni of style. That able and distinguished thinker, Cournot, h äs sought to base his philosophy on a group of /fundamentarl ideas gleaned from the various sciences : -L -such ideas ;as order, chance, prbbability. He seeks not certainties'in his philosophy. Cournot's caution and; freedom from dogmatic certitude have inilitated 'against the power and prevalence of his teachings. His "infinite probability" is in striking contrast to Comte.
Having completed this brief review öf French philosophical developments in the nineteenth "Century 4 , it only " remaias . to. be said that the official philosophy in France is still Eclecticism. Its nearest danger is that of being content to teach. Its most serious lack has beon ... fruitful dövelöpment, and that is ' s.erious enough.for a 'philosophy. An eclectic. philosophy that shall be comprehensive enough for this time must, I decidedly think, be one that shärll reconcile and do justice, in its yast synthesis, to those three great philosophic types, or ' fundamental philosophic methods, represente.d by whät I shall call Naturalism, Ratiorialism, and Moralism. r \ u Cartesianism thought to.solve s the prbblein of the universe by clearness of thought. In Opposition l to Cartesianism, the sensa-.tionalism of Condillac thought to find all the knowledge possible to us through the correct Interpretation ,of our sensations. The inoralism or Neo-Kantianism of Renouvier teaches the supreme worth of conscience and its revelations. What I maintain is, that the Eclecticism of France must find room to do justice to all three spheres or types of reality: 1) to the world of empiric reality, mediated through the senses; 2) the world of abstract truth, to which we are brought through the forms and processes of thought; 3) the world of ideal values, revealed to us in the imperatives of conscience. How hard it is to get the justice we desiderate for all these three spheres of truth or reality, the history of philosophy is a standing witness. Yet an Eclecticism that shall neglect any one of these three factors is instantly open to damaging assaults in the interests of the neglected factors. The weakness of French philosophy in the nineteenth Century has arisen from its bifurcated movement-its tendency critical and its tendency reconstructive. And not only so, but in France, äs elsewhere, we find at the close of the nineteenth Century, philosophies rather than philosophy. There the rieh and fruitful results of the philosophical specialists await some unifying power or process, whereby the lost sense of totality shall be brought back to men's minds, and the unity of knovdedge be restored in a rieh and comprehensive philosophy. French philosophy of the futüre must, perforce, partake less of a merely national character, and more-forin part-like other national philosophies-of European philosophical development. To that development it has already contributed its peculiar share of clearness of idea, lucidity of expression, precision of Statement, positiveness of spirit, fruitfulness of method, richness of principle, acuteness of thought, and wealth of System. Perhaps we shall await, with most interest, the fortunes of critical idealism and the philosophy of contingency in France during the twentieth Century.
